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BAR BRIEFS
DISCIPLINARY POWERS
Disciplinary powers given the California Bar by statute are being
so clarified by court decision, that the complaint registered by one or
two dissatisfied practitioners as to the procedure has lost practically
all of its force. This is important to North Dakota for the reason that
the 1931 annual meeting approved the California plan in principle.
In the October issue we quoted a Mr. Brennan under the heading
of "Not Smooth Sailing". Subsequent articles in the California Bar
Journal have not only set forth the rather biased character of Mr.
Brennan's criticisms, but have clearly demonstrated the advisability of
adopting California's step forward.
Summarizing a review of the California decisions in disciplinary
cases, Mr. Philbrick McCoy, Counsel for the State Bar of California,
states:
"Opinions with regard to the powers of the state bar have of
necessity differed; but because of those differences there has now been
established, through the cases here reviewed, an interpretation of those
powers by the courts which cannot' but lead to a more efficient per-
formance of the duties imposed upon the state bar by the act. And it
must be clear, too, that notwithstanding the obvious necessity for disci-
pline, the Supreme Court has been jealous in its protection of the pro-
fession in all matters coming before it for consideration. In the very
nature of things it must have been contemplated that the volume of
disciplinary work of the state bar would, at the outset, be great, and
that until such time as discipline should be meted out to those of its
members who did not respect their oaths as attorneys, and until such
time as effective means could be devised to keep out of the profession
those persons who could not satisfactorily prove their moral or their
educational fitness to practice law, the time and effort which might
otherwise be devoted to the more constructive work of the state bar
would be limited.
"It is too early to measure the effectiveness of recent act of leg-
islature respecting the admission of persons to practice law, but cer-
tainly it may be said that it can only result in raising the standard of
the entire profession. Can we expect the same of the disciplinary ac-
tivities? Unfortunately our answer, though in the affirmative, has
to be qualified in this, that the result can only be expected when not
only the members of the state bar, but the public as well, come as they
must, to a realization that the state bar will, in the continued perform-
ance of its obligations, use every effort, as it has in the past with the
approval of the Supreme Court, to see 'that every lawyer recognizes
that one who practices holds a position of public trust and that his
primary duty is to be faithful to that trust.' Nor can it be gainsaid
that, within the limits of its powers as herein discussed, the state bar
has, in the work already done, amply justified its existence."
It may be of interest to note some of the recent decisions of the
California Supreme Court, which are here cited:
Aydelotte vs. State Bar, 290 Pac. 41
In re Stafford, 284 Pac. 670
In re Richardson, 288 Pac. 669
McIntosh vs. State Bar, 294 Pac. 1067
In re Graves, 221 Pac. 411
In re Peterson, 280 Pac. 124
Golden vs. State Bar, 2 Pac. (2nd) 325
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Howe vs. State Bar, 298 Pac. 25
Bailey vs. State Bar, 288 Pac. 433
Mills vs. State Bar, 296 Pac. 280
Irving vs. State Bar, 1 Pac. (2nd) 2
Townsend vs. State Bar, 291 Pac. 837
In re Shattuck, 279 Pac. 998
In re Winne, 280 Pac. 113
In re Cate, 279 Pac. 131
Vaughan vs. State Bar, 284 Pac. 909
Brydonjack vs. State Bar, 281 Pac. 1018
Green vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 254
Fish vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 616
Dudney vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 637
Clark vs. State Bar, 82 Cal. 665
NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Ruble vs. Nyseth: Over a period of years one 0. loaned various
sums of money to defendant. Settlement was finally made and note
and mortgage given. 0. and other mortgagees agreed to a sale of
the property, the understanding being that the proceeds should go
to the mortgagees. Such disposition was made, partly, but there was
about $757.29 in the hands of the auctioneer when garnishment was
served upon him. 0. claimed this amount, it being less than his ac-
count on the note and mortgage. HELD: That 0. had a valid and
subsisting mortgage lien upon the property and the proceeds of the
sale; that same was superior to the lien of the plaintiff on his garnish-
ment proceeding.
Kittleson vs. Collette: Plaintiff, an auto dealer, and defendant, a
farmer, made a deal whereby defendant turned over to plaintiff a
house as part of the purchase price of a car. Shortly thereafter, de-
fendant sold the lot on which the house stood, giving a warranty deed.
.The tenant in the house had, in the meantime, been requested to vacate,
and did so. At time of sale of the lot, mention of sale of the house was
made, but no reference thereto was placed in the deed. Plaintiff rent-
ed the house to another without defendant's knowledge. The lot was
then sold to C., with instruction that the house had been sold to plain-
tiff, but no mention was made in that deed. Plaintiff told various
people he owned the house, tried to sell it, and made arrangements for
moving it. Plaintiff's tenant then moved out of the house, but the
last owner of the lot moved in, without the knowledge or consent of
plaintiff or defendant. C. sold the lot to P., who, in turn, sold it
back to C. This action is for the value of the house. HELD: The
parole evidence rule applies only to parties and privies. "Where a con-
troversy arises between a party to written contract and one who is nei-
ther a party to it nor privy to one who is the rule excluding parol
evidence to explain, modify, or contradict the writing does not apply."
Since, however, there was no time fixed for removal of the house, the
law gave the plaintiff a reasonable time to do so. The matter of rea-
sonable time is a question for the jury. Hence, a new trial is ordered.
CHAIN STORE LICENSING
Under this heading we quoted extracts from the U. S. Supreme
Court decision in Indiana vs. Jackson, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540 (September
